IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION

VANESSA MUNIZ GERENA,

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* DATE: May 23, 2024 11:35 a.m.

* INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

VS.

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EQUIFAX WORKFORCE * Before:

SOLUTIONS, LLC, * THE HONORABLE M. HANNAH LAUCK

* UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Defendant. * EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

*

APPEARANCES:

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

(Court convened at 11:35 a.m.) 1 DEPUTY CLERK: Case No. 3:24-CV-98, Vanessa Muniz 2 Gerena versus Equifax Workforce Solutions, LLC. 3 Plaintiff is represented by Drew Sarrett and Stephen 4 Flores. 5 Defendant is represented by Zachary McEntyre and 6 Melissa O'Boyle. 7 Are counsel ready to proceed? 8 MR. SARRETT: Plaintiff is. 9 MR. McENTYRE: Equifax is ready. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well, we're here for the 11 initial pretrial conference. And I know, Ms. O'Boyle, you're 12 going to enter a notice of appearance. 13 MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. I apologize. We were 14 on the answer, but I will enter an official notice. 15 THE COURT: Yes, it's got to be separate. So thank 16 you. 17 I normally -- and hopefully maybe sometime soon --18 will be doing these back in chambers again. I started this 19 with Covid, and I've continued it really out of an abundance of 20 caution. 21 But we're here to discuss the case. And I want you 22 to be sure that you meet my staff. And so I'm going to ask if 23 you-all could introduce yourselves, because these are the folks 24

you'll be talking to more than with me during the process.

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can you start?

DEPUTY CLERK: My name is Jessica Powell. I'm the courtroom deputy clerk.

THE COURT: And we will have another Jessica in the future who will confuse you, but just remember Jessica.

Actually, they're both fabulous. So she'll be joining us soon; she's on vacation.

Ruth?

COURT REPORTER: I'm Ruth Levy, the court reporter.

MS. DEVENDORF: And I'm Lauren Devendorf, Judge Lauck's term clerk.

MR. PETERSON: I'm Jay Peterson, the court security officer.

THE COURT: All right. So we all have seen each other before, so I know you-all know the drill. If you could just report out to me what you think we need to cover in the case and what your discussions have produced. You may do this seated, and just be sure to talk in the microphone so Ms. Levy can hear you.

MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, Drew Sarrett for the plaintiff. We had the Rule 26(f), in accordance with the Court's order. During that, we talked over a proposed schedule for, one, plaintiff to notify defendant as to whether she'll move to class certification and then also propose discovery cut-off and expert disclosure dates. And then we exchanged the

proposed schedule and there were a few revisions.

And I prepared an order for the Court's consideration -- which I have provided to defense counsel and they have signed off on -- that would just set out dates but wouldn't completely supplant the Court's standard initial pretrial order. So I have that for the Court, if Your Honor would like to take a look at it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I want to understand.

Part of the defense here is that we may not be dealing with a

CRA. And why are we doing all this if we're not dealing with a

CRA, even in part? Why aren't we getting that out of the way?

MR. McENTYRE: Your Honor, we certainly would agree with prioritizing any discovery the plaintiff thinks is necessary to determine whether the defendant is a CRA. I think the plaintiff's position is that that's a factual question as opposed to a legal question. I think they intend to conduct some discovery on that issue.

But we agree, it is a threshold question; if the defendant's not a CRA, then obviously the FCRA does not apply. And we wouldn't have any objection to prioritizing that discovery.

THE COURT: Mr. Sarrett?

MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, this case is -- I understand the Court's concern, but this case is not really akin to the *Scroggins* case in that sense, because the defendant

is acknowledging that it's a CRA. When someone requests a disclosure like maybe Ms. Muniz Gerena did, it provides the disclosure. When someone sends a dispute letter to EWS, Equifax Workforce Solutions, there's an investigation and there's a response provided.

And the underlying agreements that Equifax Workforce Solutions enters into with its customers say that it's a CRA; I mean, in this case, the data that was provided, the employment data that was provided about Ms. Muniz Gerena to the Department of Social Services was done under a contract that was entered into by the Commonwealth of Virginia to provide this consumer report information.

So, I mean, it's the defense du jour, obviously, to claim you're not a CRA. But this is not like a case where the defendant disclaims in every single instance that it's a CRA and it never provides any information that a CRA would provide. And I mean, the disclosures that are provided to Ms. Gerena acknowledge that defendant is a CRA. So that, I think, is a really tangential issue.

And we will heed what the Court's instruction is, but I don't see how the defendant can actually succeed on that.

THE COURT: Well, your paragraph 19 in your answer says that you act as a consumer reporting agency in some circumstances but deny that you're always acting as a consumer reporting agency. What the heck does that mean?

MR. McENTYRE: Your Honor, it is a complicated issue. And I agree with Mr. Sarrett that it is intertwined with the facts of the case because the definition of consumer reporting agency, under the statute, depends on whether the information provided constitutes a consumer report.

And a company like EWS may provide information, in some instances, that is a consumer report, but in other instances, the information is not a consumer report. And it depends on a number of variables, such as what the information is, the purpose for which it's collected and provided; those are fact-bound questions.

And I think there is precedent, and I'm not going to recall it off the top of my head, but there is precedent for the notion that a company may be a CRA for one purpose but not for another. Equifax, generally, not just EWS, but Equifax generally obviously provides a lot of different informational products. Some of those are clearly FCRA regulated; some are not. And there are some where I think there is a good faith dispute between the parties as to whether they are or not. Here, I think that's the issue; what exactly were we providing? What were we saying?

THE COURT: So you're going to have to give me a more concrete example. What's a non-FCRA and what's an FCRA product?

MR. McENTYRE: So a clearly FCRA product is a report

about, for example, a consumer's credit history that Equifax provides to a potential creditor so that the creditor can assess whether or not that consumer qualifies for a particular credit product, right; that would be a classic example of an FCRA-regulated product.

A non-FCRA regulated product would be directional information that Equifax or one of its affiliates provides. So in other words, Equifax may compile information and provide it to a third party, but it is not representing that this information is in fact the information about this person; it is intended as a starting point for Equifax's customer to do its own investigation, to reach its own conclusion about whether that person qualifies for employment or for credit.

And there's a key distinction, because a consumer report is only a consumer report if it is intended to be relied upon for the purpose of assessing creditworthiness or employability. If that's not the purpose -- and both Equifax or its affiliate and the end user of the product know that's not the purpose -- then that is not a consumer report. And as a result, Equifax or its affiliates is not acting as a reporting agency when it provides that information.

THE COURT: So, like, I don't know what you mean by "directional information."

MR. McENTYRE: So, for example, I think in this case the allegation is that Equifax provided a report that included

information about where people with a name similar to the plaintiff's name have lived within a certain period of time. If Equifax is not representing that in fact it was this person who lived in all of those place, Equifax is not representing that we're talking about this plaintiff. It's just saying we have conducted a basic search to try to find background information about people with similar characteristics, similar name, similar date of birth, something like that, and it provides it to the end user; that is not, in our view, a consumer report.

THE COURT: So if you provide -- if you're actually saying it's probably or could be inaccurate, that's what makes it not a credit report?

MR. McENTYRE: We're not saying -- we're not making a representation that the information is about this plaintiff. The request from the end user is not, as in the context of a classic consumer report, tell me factually all of the information you have about this person. The request from the end user is we are doing a background investigation and we need to -- somebody needs to help us do the first stage of the research to then help us assess whether this person is who he or she says she is.

So we're not saying the information is inaccurate; it's not a matter of accuracy or inaccuracy. There was --

THE COURT: But you're assuring the accuracy, right?

So you're giving yourself the out, but it could be.

MR. McENTYRE: We're not being asked to assure the accuracy. We're not being asked to provide actual information that's accurate or inaccurate. There's an Eleventh Circuit case called Lohse which is directly on point. In the Lohse case, the plaintiff had applied to be a Little League coach and the defendant had provided the Little League with a background report about the plaintiff that said someone with characteristics similar to his was a sex offender. It turned out the person with characteristics similar to his was his father, his estranged father.

The Eleventh Circuit said, as unfortunate as that course of events may have been, that document, the information that was provided was not inaccurate. As I recall -- I can't recall off the top of my head if the Eleventh Circuit reached the CRA versus non-CRA distinction, but it was an issue in the case. And it's related to the accuracy question, what are you representing? If you're not representing that these are the exact facts about this person, if that's not what you were asked to present, that may not be a consumer report.

THE COURT: So in the -- is it *Lohse* case? -- was it Equifax or TransUnion or Experian that was reporting it or somebody else?

MR. McENTYRE: No, I'm not going to remember the name. It was a specialty background check company.

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MR. SARRETT:
                              Your Honor, I don't want to interrupt
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     his flow, but that case is actually Erickson v. First
     Advantage; the Lohse case is not the case that is being
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     discussed.
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               MR. McENTYRE: I appreciate Mr. Sarrett's
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     clarification. I have Lohse on the brain for a different
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     matter.
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               THE COURT:
                            That's okay.
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                              All the FCRA cases sometimes meld in
               MR. McENTYRE:
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               But it is the Erickson case that I'm thinking about.
     my head.
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               MR. SARRETT: And First Advantage is a background
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     screening company.
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               MR. McENTYRE: Which, Your Honor, is the same
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     business that Equifax Workforce Solutions is in. So it's
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     important to note that the defendant in this case is not
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     Equifax Information Solutions, which for, I think we would
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     acknowledge, almost all purposes if not all purposes -- not
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     quite all, but most purposes -- is a CRA. I know Your Honor's
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     had many cases with Equifax Information Services as a defendant
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     and you've not heard that entity argue it is not a CRA because
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     the vast majority of the products it provides are consumer
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     reports.
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               Equifax Workforce Solutions is a different affiliate.
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It is a different business which is more akin to a background

screening type product than a traditional financial consumer

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report.

THE COURT: But it does provide consumer reports, which presumably -- does First Advantage provide consumer reports, too?

MR. McENTYRE: Yes. Sometimes they are; sometimes they're not. It's a fact-bound -- that's why the analytical inquiry starts with whether the actual information was a consumer report. Because the answer to that question informs whether the defendant is a CRA. The fact that a company is a CRA for most purposes, there is no sort of CFPB authorized list that says "these companies are factually CRAs for every purpose." It's not a factual question; it's a legal question that is fact-bound.

MR. SARRETT: May I respond?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SARRETT: First of all, the CFPB does publish a list of consumer reporting agencies. I could pull it up and show it to the Court, but I'm not confident that EWS is on it.

Second, the Court is probably all too familiar with this issue that we're discussing. The seminal case on consumer reporting and whether an entity is a consumer reporting agency and whether or not a particular piece of information or collection of information constitutes a consumer report is this Yang v. Government Employees Insurance Company from the Eleventh Circuit that's obviously an issue in Scroggins.

But the fundamental problem for defendant's argument goes beyond this case law. The defendant entered into a contract with the Commonwealth of Virginia. And I'm reading from the contract. And what it says is, "The contractor" -- that's EWS -- "shall provide verification, employment, and income information services as set forth herein. Under this contract and only with the permissible purpose under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, purchasing agency and its eligibility workers for local departments of social services will be able to access this data to verify employment ranges and employment terminations for applicants and recipients of TANF, SNAP, Medicaid, and other public assistance programs."

I didn't read out the words that make up the acronyms for TANF or SNAP, but the rest of what I said was directly from the contract.

So I understand that they're making this argument. It will fail for multiple reasons. The first one being that they agree that they're a CRA. But I don't think it should waylay full discovery and class certification.

MR. McENTYRE: Your Honor, may I briefly respond?

First, I understand that CFPB has a list; I think we actually cited the case in a case we had in front of Your Honor about ten years ago in a motion to dismiss, which Your Honor denied. There's no question that CFPB has a list.

My point is that I think it's -- I'm not going to say

Your Honor held it -- but our argument was that our defendant in this case was not on the list and therefore was not a CRA.

And I think Mr. Bennett's argument was that list is not dispositive. I'm simply making the same point.

A company might be on the list because some of its products are consumer reports, but that doesn't mean all of them. That's the point I'm trying to make. I understand the contract says what Mr. Sarrett said. It's not all the contract says.

And to go back to Your Honor's original question, we have not proposed any sort of staggering of discovery to prioritize this issue; there are many other issues, including the accuracy of the information that was provided within the specific context of the report that was provided. There's a lot of other issues that we'll need to litigate. And some of those may very well overcome this issue and this may not even be a defense that we ultimately raise in a motion for summary judgment.

I was simply agreeing that if Your Honor thought it would be more efficient to deal with this issue first, we don't have any problem with that. We haven't proposed it. And I think, as we've proposed in the joint schedule, I think it might be just as efficient to deal with some of the other issues and to see the progress we make on those and whether those create some opening for an off-ramp of litigation or

earlier briefing of summary judgement or -- and I think this is flagged in the schedule -- for plaintiff to decide whether they intend to seek class certification. As we understand it, that's not a decision that they've made. And that's the first deadline in the schedule.

So I think it would be every bit as efficient -- and I think this is what the parties envisioned -- for the parties to do the discovery necessary for the plaintiff to decide whether to seek class certification. If the plaintiff decides not to seek class certification, as we all know from experience, these cases have a tendency to resolve. If the plaintiff does seek class certification, we're in a very different environment.

THE COURT: All right. Well, that's a helpful discussion. What I don't want is a significant amount of sideways movement as far as discovery or focusing on issues that are or are not brought to the Court.

And so let me say this: You say the cutoff is

February 3rd and by September 23rd, the plaintiffs will provide

notice. I'm going to be honest with you guys: You-all blow

deadlines a lot. I'm just going to say it. So what do I do if

that's the case? And the deadline blowing tends to be in

discovery disputes.

MR. SARRETT: Well, Your Honor, hope springs eternal for us that not we're not going to have one of these

knock-down, drag-out discovery fights. We've had a discussion -- one of the issues in this case and one of the issues that came up in the Rule 26(f) is we don't know a lot about EWS's business because we haven't litigated against them specifically. Equifax is a different story.

And what we discussed during the Rule 26(f) was how about we try and move quickly to have an exchange of documents and information to see whether there's going to be big fights in discovery over some of these issues; for instance, whether the FCRA even applies or other issues related to class certification. And I think we have a tentative agreement on that to do that.

But, unfortunately, from the plaintiff's perspective, until we start seeing what comes in, we don't know if we're going to have to fight over every single thing. We hope we don't. But if the Court is amenable to pushing back some of these deadlines, plaintiff has no issue with that.

THE COURT: I'm not talking about pushing back deadlines. I'm talking about meeting deadlines. I've been given a lot of these kinds of orders. And they can be rendered meaningless with some regularity. And if you-all have some kind of discovery issue, some kind of issue of fact that you need to resolve, be honest about it with me. Don't give me stuff you're not going to meet.

You-all can try whatever case you want, but try the

case you're telling me you're trying. Don't try the case you think might be the best case scenario, because it's a waste of my time. I'm here to make decisions. But I am not here to watch parties go back and forth about big and little issues when the big issues are the ones that need to be resolved and you're not teeing them up. I'm not doing that anymore for you guys. So that's a problem.

MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, as Your Honor's pointed out, the delays are often encountered in discovery and getting --

THE COURT: Which you're giving me the clue-up right now, Mr. Sarrett: "Well, they're not going to give me information about whether or not they're a CRA." "They're holding back on stuff." "We haven't litigated against them." "We don't know how it works."

They're going to say they're giving you the information; that's a dispute. It's going to come in front of me. Don't pretend like it's not going to if you are pretty sure it will. So from February of '24 to September of '24 -- then I have to do months -- seven months where you find out you actually have a fight. That's what you're proposing to me.

MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, in order -- in any case in which we're trying to get a class certified, we have to have certain information and documents to be able to do that. And we will work with defense counsel to get that.

I think the Court's concern is that there's going to be a delay in that happening, and then there's going to be a fight, and then all these deadlines are going to have to be pushed back. My suggestion, respectfully, to resolve -- or try and avoid that scenario is to put in place some framework where we have no choice but to present any issues to the Court rapidly. And the Court could do that in several ways, one of which could be if the Court wants to refer it to one of the magistrate judges and we go ahead and set a schedule where we report and handle it that way.

The other option would be -- and it might not work in this case -- but in certain of Judge Payne cases, we have a telephone conference whenever there's a dispute, and if the Court can't resolve it during that telephone conference, then we have an expedited process for dealing with it. I think that's the real concern; it's a legitimate concern that the Court has.

And we are not trying to give Your Honor an order that we know we can't comply with; we're hoping we will get the information and documents. But I think if we have a framework in place to go ahead and deal with disputes -- are there going to be disputes? Probably, because if -- there's a lot at stake in the litigation and there's going to be fights over certain issues. But if we have a framework to try and resolve them quickly, I think that that would help us keep things moving

along.

THE COURT: Well, why are you focusing on whether or not you're going to certify a class? How is that separate from the CRA issue?

MR. SARRETT: The defendant proposed the notice period, that we provide them notice. And we had no issue with that. We thought it was reasonable, if they wanted us to do that, that we would agree with it.

I don't think the CRA issue looms in this case substantively; I really don't. I think there may be other issues of identifying individuals and that sort of thing, getting the information and documents out of databases from EWS, but I don't know that we're going to have -- I don't think we're going to have this merits fight over CRA status that's going to drive the entirety of the litigation. But I do think it's a good idea to have a framework in place for us to be reporting to the Court on issues --

THE COURT: Well, you know, Mr. Sarrett, here's the thing: I am here to make decisions. I am here to have lawyers fight hard but also reasonably. We have two magistrate judges. And they can work full time on your cases. I can work full time on your cases. And then we can ignore the other 199 cases that we cover. Or not.

You two, in my period here, have worked really well together. And you've stopped working together. I don't know

why. But I can tell you I'm not doing a hundred percent FCRA cases a hundred percent of the time and I'm not making my magistrate judges do it because you guys stopped getting along.

I don't know what is going on with you. But given the outcome, given the amount of time, given the number of cases that have been involved, it's not rationally explicable. Something is up. So I'm putting you-all on notice about this. I don't like any kind of litigation where it gets down to spitting contests.

So you-all are the preeminent lawyers in this area of the law in the nation. And I'm probably as educated a judge, this Court is about as educated a set of judges as you're ever going to get, but it does not mean that you just keep coming in, saying you're going to do something, and then not doing it.

So I am aware that there is a lot of passion involved, but it cannot drive rational business decisions and legal decision-making.

MR. McENTYRE: Your Honor, can I just say one thing?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. McENTYRE: I'm sorry to interrupt you. And I apologize if this is not helpful, but I did want to provide some context. So our firm does not represent Equifax in its single-plaintiff cases, and I really don't know what happens; we handle the class actions. And we have not had a class action against Mr. Bennett's firm that got into any real

discovery disputes in a number of years. So in the class actions, at least, which is really all I know about, we all have continued to have, I think, a very productive working relationship and we've avoided some of the problems that we had ten years ago or so.

So I only wanted to provide that context. Obviously, Your Honor would not be expected to know which lawyers handle which cases, but to the extent there's been a problem with a lot of the Equifax cases with Mr. Bennett, our firm has not been involved in those and I don't have any idea what's going on.

We remain committed to having the same productive working relationship we've had with Mr. Bennett and avoiding overtaxing the Court's time for the last several years.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to enter this order.

But you are going to report to me as well on September 23rd about what the status is of the class certification. And I'll enter whatever order I believe is necessary based on my initial pretrial order. I will set these deadlines. I haven't looked at my calendar; I don't know if I have other deadlines that might require a day or two or a week or two off on this, but I'll just enter them as I see fit.

I do hope that this remains, the relationship you've had. But I can tell you, Mr. Sarrett, I try my cases. I don't try Judge Payne's cases. I do my docket the way I do my

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And I have been very successful doing it my way. if litigants are unproductive in what they do, it doesn't mean I change. MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, I apologize; I was in no way --THE COURT: I don't want to hear it, Mr. Sarrett. I knew what you meant. MR. SARRETT: Your Honor, I did not mean in any way to insinuate that there was something -- all I was asking was that if there was a framework in place --THE COURT: I have my framework. What I was saying is you have not been meeting my framework, and I want you to start meeting it. That's what I said; that's all you had to hear. The only thing I was hoping to do was MR. SARRETT: just have a schedule in place so that we absolutely had to report or provide information so that there was no way in which we would be delaying anything and not doing charts and that sort of thing. That's all I was proposing. Not that it needed to be changed from the charts or anything of that matter and I certainly --THE COURT: You said unless I wanted to take calls like Judge Payne did. Listen, think about what you're saying, Mr. Sarrett. And you know -- can you look at me, please?

don't talk like this very often. I never talk to lawyers as

expert as you are very often, if at all, like this. 1 2 Please just hear what I'm saying. Just meet these deadlines. And I change the deadlines if they need to be 3 changed, reasonably. Okay? 4 MR. SARRETT: Yes, Your Honor. I apologize; I did 5 not mean to offend the Court in any way. 6 THE COURT: I'm not offended; I'm disappointed. Just 7 try your cases. 8 All right. I'm going to enter this order, and I will 9 change it to the degree that I will require a report to the 10 Court on September 23rd. All right. 11 (Court concluded at 12:12 p.m.) 12 13 14 15 CERTIFICATE 16 I, Ruth A. Levy, RPR, certify that the 17 foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of 18 proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 19 20 Date: 06/10/2024 /s/ Ruth A. Levy, RPR 21 22 23 24 25